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Matthew Gibson: Expanding the State: Disarmament in the British Mandate of Iraq, 1919-1927 
(Under the direction of Sarah Shields)  
 
Arms proliferation, following the First World War, presented tremendous problems for 
British-colonial governance in the Middle East. Specifically, the Iraqi revolt of 1920 against 
British occupation illustrated a larger problem: how can the imperial government halt arms 
transfers and the use of arms within Iraq while balancing their interests? This project argues that 
Britain’s selective-disarmament process secured its state-building project and domination in the 
Middle East. Disarmament impacted the internal and regional relationships between the colonial 
government and its imperial allies; subsequently, cross-border gun-smuggling weakened Anglo-
French relations.  Within recent decades, the US involvement in  Iraq since the early 2000s has 
impacted the historiography of state-building. This project is influenced by similar events but 
centering arms prohibition tells a nuanced story of state-building in Iraq. The story highlights 
both the difficulties and frustrations of the State to consolidate power and tribal communities’ 
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Delegates from twenty-one states and empires from across the globe shuffled into the 
Chateau Neuf in Southwest Paris to discuss postwar conditions on September 10, 1919. The 
treaty of Saint-Germain is commonly known for ending the First World War and establishing 
new states in the former Austrian empire. The conference and treaty also addressed another 
issue: Disarmament. The international mobilization of states and empires, and the violence that 
continued after the war, had left large quantities of arms and ammunitions in both non-colonized 
and colonized territories.1 Major powers understood the threat of arms proliferation in their 
colonies and mandated territories. They included in the St. Germain treaty provisions to meet the 
challenge of widespread armaments: "in certain parts of the world it is necessary to exercise 
special supervision over the trade-in, and the possession of, arms and ammunition…" "Existing 
treaties and conventions…no longer meet present conditions, which require more elaborate 
provisions…and the establishment of a corresponding regime in certain territories in Asia."2  
While the conference inaugurated new procedures on international disarmament, Britain crafted 
an arms confiscation regime in its new, colonized territories in the Middle East. Here, however, 
 
1“Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, and Protocol.” The American Journal of 
International Law 15, no. 4 (1921): 297. Notable conflicts occurring during this peace keeping deal are the Russian 
Revolution (1917-1923), the paramilitary violence taking place in Central Europe, and the Irish War of 
Independence (1919-1921). Conflicts taking place in colonized territories to think about during this time are the 
Iraqi Revolt (1920), Anglo-Somali campaigns (1902-1922), and the third Anglo-Afghan war (1919).  
 
2“Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, and Protocol,” 297.  
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the British reconfigured the provisions in the St. Germain treaty not merely to prevent another 
war, but instead to solve an arms crisis through an imperial lens. 
Within months, Britain was facing anticolonial resistance to British military occupation 
in Iraq. Lieutenant-General Sir James Aylmer Haldane, during his occupation campaigns in Iraq, 
reported that there were 300,000 rifles in Mesopotamia in 1920, between 50,000 and 60,000 in 
the hands of Iraq’s tribes.3 Tribal communities acquired these rifles in a variety of ways. Some 
tribesmen looted firearms from battlefields, while others took weapons from fugitives and 
deserters, received arms from the Turks and Germans as partisans, and bought rifles from Persian 
and Syrian markets.4 The accessibility of these weapons was not only a threat to British 
occupation in Iraq, but it was also a regional threat, making disarmament an imperative for a 
more secure British rule. 
The uprising in the summer of 1920 sharpened the rhetoric and hastened Britain’s plans 
for disarmament in Iraq.  As the uprising was coming to an end in mid-October, Lieutenant-
General Sir Aylmer L. Haldane was transferred from the Rhineland to Mesopotamia and 
appointed General Officer, Commander-in-Chief by Winston Churchill. His objective was to 
suppress and disarm resistance to British occupation. Ultimately, Haldane believed that he was 
bringing liberty, law, and order to Mesopotamia and anticipated Mesopotamia's role in the Pax 
Britannica. His experience as a military officer already included similar occupations and 
disarmament campaigns on the Northwest Frontier of India. Haldane’s goals after the 
insurrection focused on the need for disarmament. "I hoped not only to disarm and otherwise 
 
3James Aylmer Haldane. The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920. (William Blackwood and Sons: London, 1922), 
257.  
 




punish those who had fought against us [Britain], but to deprive of rifles all who possessed such 
weapons for self-protection and use in inter-tribal feuds, or who might rely on such means to 
coerce the Arab Government which was just about to spring into existence."5  
Britain was unwilling to exhaust military personnel and resources chasing gun smugglers, 
religious agitators, and external suppliers despite the efficacy of Haldane's tactics on the ground. 
A 1920 military investigative report from the Indian Office reflected Britain’s fear of continuing 
agitation from within and outside the region. "These disturbances have their origin from sources 
outside Syria and Mesopotamia" and "the tribes in Mesopotamia are instructed by the Mujtahids 
to arm themselves and await instructions."6 This report emphasized the government’s need for 
eyes on the ground and reliable partners if they were to succeed. What also followed from this 
report was the creation of the “Leachman line” (created by British Colonel Gerard Leachman), 
which tasked France and Britain to build security fortifications on the border between Syria and 
Iraq to shield cross-border anti-British support.7 The Leachman line was one way for Britain to 
demarcate an area within which to confiscate weapons while working with a regional ally.  
Strategically, Haldane’s approach to disarmament, the India Office’s analysis, and the 
Leachman line had broader implications for the safety and protection of Iraq’s future state-
building project. If Britain could cultivate an effective centralized state, it could meet the 
demands of disarmament on terms that could benefit the empire.8 While the Treaty of St. 
 
5Haldane, 257. Haldane had prior experience in disarmament campaigns and negotiations during the Afridi and 
Pashtun wars of 1898. He was also a mediator between Russia and Japan after the war ended in 1905.  
 
6IOR/L/PS/18/B348, Qatar Digital Library,  Mesopotamia. Preliminary Report on Causes of Unrest, Government of 
India for Arab Bureau, September 1920.  
 
7Carl Shook, “The Origins and Development of Iraq’s National Boundaries, 1918-1932: Policing and Political 
Geography in the Iraq-Nejd and Iraq-Syria Borderlands”  (Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2018), 227.  
 
8In this project, I employ the theoretical concepts of the state and state violence from Charles Tilly and Max Weber. 
In Tilly’s book Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992, the state is a coercion-wielding organization 
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Germain aimed to disarm empires and colonial territories internationally, Britain implemented a 
selective-disarmament process in Iraq to secure its state-building project and domination in the 
Middle East. Disarmament also framed the internal and regional relationships between the 
colonial government and its imperial allies; however, gun-smuggling in tribal communities and 
frontiers weakened these diplomatic relationships.  
The historiography of disarmament after World War I is geographically concerned with 
Europe and the League of Nations, so regions like the Middle East are understudied. Historians 
utilize a transnational approach to study disarmament, and the scholarship has addressed the 
problems between empires and "small states" in Europe regarding international law, sovereignty, 
and power.9 The League of Nation’s disarmament initiative favored significant powers like 
Britain and France, which has led most scholars to conclude that this global initiative's 
pragmatism was determined and driven by Great Powers' self-interests.10 Scholars have focused 
on analyzing arms prohibition in the "prohibited zones" (places like Africa and the Middle East) 
 
that is distinct from households and kinship groups and exercises clear priority over all other organizations within a 
territory. According Weber in his Vocation Lectures, the state has a claim to legitimate physical violence within a 
particular territory. Only within the geographical boundaries does the state use force against subjugated peoples.  
 
9Beginning with the historiography of disarmament, E.H. Carr’s book The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939 
questions power and its distribution in the international system. Carr was not a historian so as a political scientist, he 
was concerned with international relations, and his research interests have shaped the literature of the field. The field 
has been primarily concerned with analyzing disarmament from different angles.  Andrew Webster’s article “From 
Versailles to Geneva: The Many Forms of Interwar Disarmament” traces the evolution of disarmament from the end 
of World War I to the 1925 disarmament conference, focusing on the interaction between various state politicians. 
For more information about the League of Nations and Disarmament see Andrew Webster’s articles “Absolutely 
Irresponsible Amateurs: The Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments, 1921-1924,” and Alan Sharp’s article 
“The Enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles.” Webster’s article highlights the tension between the TMCA (civilian 
committee and military generals about the practicality of global disarmament. Sharp, on the other hand illustrates the 
inability of the League to enforce any formal disarmament.  
 
10Andrew Webster, “From Versailles to Geneva.” 229; Susan Pedersen’s The Guardians: The League of Nations and 
the Crisis of Empire focuses on the diplomatic history of the League of Nations but also highlights how colonized 
subjects used the platform in Geneva to speak against economic concessions, imperial authority, notions of 
civilization and the civilization mission to dismantle and critique the cohesive relationship between empire and the 




but only as a tangential argument about the acquisition of arms by small states. David Stone 
argued that, despite the Great Powers' ability to manipulate international politics, small states' 
agency derived from their dependency on imports and exports to and from colonized territories.11 
Small states needed weapons to defend themselves from encroaching neighbors or internal 
disputes, so they refused to approve international measures that infringed on their sovereignty 
and security. Meanwhile, regions deprived of independence entirely, like the Middle East, 
became a sideshow in the disarmament conversation. This project centers on the Middle East for 
that very reason and illustrates what imperial (or more appropriately, “mandate”) disarmament 
looked like on the ground.  
While historians of the Middle East have not explicitly discussed disarmament, recent 
scholarship has focused on the British intelligence community, military technology, and the 
state's role in mediating sectarian and minority conflicts.12 The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has 
refocused attention on the history of Iraq, and scholars have uncovered the parallels between 
U.S. and British state-building projects. Like the US in 2004, Britain was caught between two 
imperatives during the interwar period: controlling a strategic region and reconstituting the 
international order through modern state sovereignty.13 Simply giving Iraq independence was 
counterproductive to Britain’s interests. These competing imperatives created an awkward 
 
11David R. Stone. “Imperialism and Sovereignty: The League of Nations’ Drive to Control the Global Arms Trade.” 
Journal of Contemporary History 35, no. 2 (April 1, 2000): 216.  
 
12The foundational scholarship on Mandate governance in Iraq are David Fromkin’s A Peace to End all Peace: The 
Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East and Peter Sluglett’s Britain in Iraq 1914-
1932. For information on class politics and Arab Nationalism see Hanna Batatu’s The Old Social Classes & The 
Revolutionary Movement In Iraq. 
 
13Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), 4. See also Peter Sluglett’s Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932, Dodge’s work is a complement to 
Slugglett’s book and benefits from a few extra sources such as private players of British and Indian colonial officers 




relationship between the mandate government and its subjects, and this relationship created 
conflict at times. Moreover, institutions like the British Royal Air Force and intelligence 
networks became interdependent systems. These systems sustained the British empire in the 
Middle East to combat anti-colonial resistance.14 However, the intelligence network’s goals did 
not work within Iraq. Because of this inadequacy, state power was limited in its ability to control 
frontier spaces near the shared border between French Syria and Iraq.15  
This project builds on much of the scholarship in both the historiographies of Iraq and 
disarmament.  Firstly, in most studies of disarmament, the unit of analysis is the state. While this 
project also focuses on the state, it expands our understanding of how the British empire created 
ad hoc arms protocols that were different from the treaty of St. Germain. As a result, it utilizes 
sources outside of the League of Nations Yearbooks and the debates in Geneva concerning arms 
prohibition. Instead, I use colonial records and military sources to provide an almost "ground 
level" illustration of arms confiscation and its limits.16 The League of Nations Yearbooks 
provide statistical and economic information about arms prohibition and only discusses 
 
14Priya Satia. “The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia.” The American Historical 
Review 111, no. 1 (2006): 19.  
 
15Martin Thomas. “Anglo–French Imperial Relations in the Arab World: Intelligence Liaison and Nationalist 
Disorder, 1920–1939.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 17, no. 4 (December 1, 2006): 773.; see also his book Fight or 
Flight: Britain, France, and the Roads from Empire. It is a microhistory of decolonization, but his early chapters 
compare and contrasts Britain and France’s intelligence networks and how it was a risk assessment on whether they 
should engage nationalist enemies or somehow compromise with them. 
 
16Since arms in the Middle East are severely understudied, I referenced Africanist literature to get a better sense of 
the relationship between arms and British governance. For the history of firearms in Africa before World War I see, 
Anthony Atmore and Peter Sanders’ “Sotho Arms and Ammunition in the Nineteenth Century.”; R. W. Beachey’s 
“The Arms Trade in East Africa in the Late Nineteenth Century.”; James Cooke’s “Anglo-French Diplomacy and 
the Contraband Arms Trade in Colonial Africa, 1894-1897.”; Lina Grip’s “History Never Repeats? Imports, Impact 
and Control of Small Arms in Africa.”;  J.J. Guy’s “A Note on Firearms in the Zulu Kingdom with Special 
Reference to the Anglo-Zulu War, 1879,”; William Storey’s Guns, Race, and Power in Colonial South Africa; 
Gavin White’s “Firearms in Africa: An Introduction.”; Macola, Giacomo. “Reassessing the Significance of Firearms 
in Central Africa: The Case of North-Western Zambia to the 1920s.” The Journal of African History 51, no. 3 
(November 2010): 301–21. and, Saheed Aderinto.  Guns and Society in Colonial Nigeria: Firearms, Culture, and 
Public Order. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2018. 
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relationships between states, while colonial records and military sources provide examples of the 
state and its subjects interactions around the issue of arms prohibition. Secondly, this project 
continues the conversation about the imperial state in the Middle East. Lastly,  it also focuses on 
the presence of arms and ammunition in the region, the formulation of trade and resistance 
networks, and the state's effort to monopolize violence by utilizing sources on the interwar 
Middle East. 
After examining the secondary literature, this project asks three central questions: What 
did disarmament in Iraq look like in rural areas? How did disarmament expand state sovereignty? 
How did disarmament influence the relationship between the state and its subjects? Arms were 
just as much of an issue in the Middle East as they were in post-war Europe, but scholars from 
both historiographies have not considered studying this topic within mandate governance.17 
Therefore, this project is not concerned with the evolution of disarmament in Geneva or the 
League of Nations after St. Germain. Instead, this project centers the Middle East and seeks to 
analyze disarmament treaties like St. Germain as a framework that is altered and applied by the 
colonial government in Iraq.   
Each section follows a chronological structure to elucidate the evolution and trial and 
error of ad hoc arms control.  The first section illustrates the strategic importance of the Middle 
East during and after World War I. I explore the intentions of disarmament in the treaty of St. 
Germain and distinguish it from British intentions in Iraq during the interwar period. This section 
traces the disarmament concept through conferences and diplomatic meetings between 1917 and 
 
17The study of arms in the Middle East during the interwar period is a new interjection to the field.  There were 
previous studies of arms trade, but it focuses on Ottoman arms imports. See John Grant’s article “The Sword of the 
Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914.” Also, on the idea of maintaining public order, since disarmament was 
very ambiguous at times, the definition of “public order” and far one needed to go to maintain was left to the 
imperial government to decide which is reflected in both British Foreign Office paper and Disarmament yearbooks.  
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1920. It ends with an assessment of the Iraqi revolt of 1920 to elucidate some of the problems 
that Britain would face afterwards. The second section begins with the Cairo Conference of 1921 
in which British officials theoretically designed and constructed an Iraqi state to centralize power 
and violence. This aspect of state-building took on the form of (re)armament, where Britain 
provided arms to loyal tribes and Faisal’s small-indigenous army. 
While the (re)armament strategy seemed formidable, the breakdown in tribal alliances 
and cross-border gun-smuggling fractured the internal and regional relationships, which is the 
main focus of the last two sections. Section three focuses specifically on the years 1923 and 1924 
as a reaction to failed tribal alliances. The mandate government’s last (re)armament initiative 
was the enlistment of minority-levied units to respond to internal disputes, while the RAF was 
simultaneously codifying their airpower doctrine to respond to arms-smugglers and disrupt tribal 
trade networks.  This section demonstrates the culmination of disarmament in Iraq as the 
codification of "legitimate" versus "illegitimate" arms carriers. This section uses the concept of 
coercive-state power to critically study the expansion of state power and the repressive 
disarmament of non-state actors.  Lastly, the fourth section studies the frontier – specifically the 
Iraqi-Syrian border – between 1925-1927. Tribal groups in western and southwestern Iraq 
bought their guns near the Iraqi-Syrian border. There was inconsistent surveillance in this space 
that contributed to the breakdown in Anglo-French relations, threatened mandate power 
structures, and challenged international consensus about borders. This section illustrates these 










British Interest in the Middle East and Disarmament, 1917-1920 
The road to the British empire in the Middle East is both a regional and international 
story, especially within a military context. The British empire had coveted the region before the 
interwar period, and the League of Nations made it possible for the British and French empires to 
establish mandated regimes in the newly partitioned states of the former Ottoman empire. 
Traditionally, the regional roadmap and timeline for this partitioned region begins with the 1916 
Sykes-Picot agreement and the military campaigns of Shariff Hussein's Arab resistance fighters 
with the aid of Field Marshall Edmund Allenby and T.E. Lawrence.18  While these events and 
people are essential for the historical canon, this section begins with Mark Sykes’s 1917 speech. 
It traces the idea of disarmament in the Middle East by focusing on the Mudros Conference 
between British and Ottoman officials and transitions into the international development of 
disarmament in the Middle East by focusing on the St. Germain Conference. The section ends 
with an analysis of the Iraqi revolt in 1920. By focusing on these events, the explicit aims of 
international disarmament – to prevent another war in Europe – take on new meaning in an 
imperial context.19 
 
18Eugene Rogan. The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East. (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 
400.  
 
19It is important to note here that selective disarmament is not unique to the Middle East. See Saheed Aderinto’s 
Guns and Society in Colonial Nigeria, Macola, Giacomo. “Reassessing the Significance of Firearms in Central 
Africa: The Case of North-Western Zambia to the 1920s,” and Lina Grip’s “History Never Repeats? Imports, Impact 
and Control of Small Arms in Africa.” While these scholars do not explicitly use the term “selective disarmament,” 
the employment of categories, such as race, social class, and political economy illustrates that disarmament in 
colonial territories functions differently than in Europe.  
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Before delving into the core content of this section, it is important to discuss how the 
weapons from World War I altered Ottoman warfare and society completely. Rifles like the Lee 
Enfield and German Mauser led to quicker reloading techniques, better accuracy, and greater 
distance than older models like the muzzle and breech-loading rifles. These new-age weapons 
were also lighter and allowed for repeated fire as opposed to the traditional single shot.20 Even 
rapid-firing weapons like the Lewis light machine gun, the German Maxim MG, and heavy 
artillery transformed the damage capabilities for soldiers, heavily armored vehicles, and 
airplanes. The Ottoman empire's military-modernization project led to hundreds of thousands of 
high-caliber weapons exported to the region from European – and American – manufacturers 
after a humiliating defeat during the Russo-Turkish war from 1877 to 1878.21 Consequently, the 
modernization of the military and the Great War contributed to the influx of weapons to the 
Middle East. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed, these weapons remained in a society that was 
very familiar with military technology and training.  
Also, the expansion of military schools in the Ottoman empire created knowledgeable 
and experienced soldiers. The Ottoman government started its first military educational 
institution in 1834. Still, it was limited to elite individuals within society, which stifled the 
military's modernization and the quality of experienced soldiers.  By 1870, the Ottomans opened 
middle and preparatory military schools across the empire in places like the Balkans, Yemen, 
Greater Syria, and even Baghdad, where it was open to both upper-peasantry and lower-middle-
class urbanites. The Ottoman government created a tribal military school explicitly for rural 
 
 
20W.J. Landen. “The German Mauser.” Marine Corps Gazette (Pre-1994): Quantico 24, no.3 (September 1940), 27. 
 
21Jonathan Grant. “The Sword of the Sultan: Ottoman Arms Imports, 1854-1914.” The Journal of Military History. 




populations, where young boys became soldiers and eventually officers. The enrollment began 
with one-thousand boys each year but grew exponentially by 1900, enrolling tens of thousands of 
boys annually.22 
To understand these numbers' scale, the lower-level Baghdad military school alone 
enrolled more boys than the private, missionary, and state-run middle schools combined in 
1900.23 The curriculum taught these young men discipline, their native languages (Kurdish, 
Arabic, Greek, etc.), and a sense of loyalty to the Ottoman state. When they graduated from 
preparatory school, most continued into the academy to become commissioned officers, where 
they learned military drills, field medicine, surveying, fortifications, reconnaissance, technology, 
and cartography.24 The combination of intense military education, the wars in the Balkans (1911-
1913), and the Great War provided many Arab men with combat experience that became 
beneficial during skirmishes after the First World War. However, this preparation worried British 
officials as they theorized about the role the Middle East would play after the war and the 
implications for imperial security.  
Mark Sykes is famous for his role in the Sykes-Picot agreement (an agreement with 
Francois Georges-Picot to partition the Middle East into small statelets and spheres of influence). 
Still, little is mentioned about his views concerning arms in the Middle East and their threat to 
the British empire after the war. In January 1917, the Great War was far from over, but British 
officials from various governmental departments met in Whitehall to discuss arms traffic. Mark 
 
22Michael Provence. “Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East.” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies. 43 (2011), 209.  
 
23Provence. “Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East,”  209.  
 
24Provence, “Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East,” 211. See also Benjamin 




Sykes – notoriously conservative and an advocate for imperialism – delivered a passionate 
speech at Whitehall about the threat of arms proliferation in colonies after the First World War. 
He argued that the "world's total stocks of destructive weapons would, in fact, be infinitely 
greater than at any previous period in history, and the difficulty of preventing these weapons 
from reaching undesirable hands will be proportionately increased."25 Sykes was particularly 
focused on British colonies, and the ability for “savage tribesmen” to possess modern firearms 
and cause civil unrest. The post-war acquisition of territories in the Middle East brought this 
imperial concern to the region.  
Strategically, the Middle East under Ottoman control threatened British colonies in 
Africa and South Asia. For example, the Ottomans transported arms from the Arabian Peninsula 
to Somalia and Sudan, aiding anticolonial rebellions against British occupation during the war. 
Additionally, ships from both Ottoman and Persian ports delivered weapons to India – the British 
Empire's crown jewel.26 Therefore, governmental stability and British oversight in Mesopotamia 
and the Arabian Peninsula would be essential to prevent arms smuggling to other strategic areas.   
The mass quantity of arms in the Middle East concerned British officials, but Sykes 
discussed an additional threat. In the same speech at Whitehall, Sykes believed that nationalist 
agitators in Egypt and India would spark a mass revolution, especially with the access to guns. 
He stated, "when the war is over we shall, in Asia at all events, suffer from a great deal of social 
and political unrest…”27 Sykes's fear of global anti-colonial resistance was influenced by what 
 
25Memorandum by Sir Mark Sykes, Bart, M.P., 12 Jan 1917 in Daniel Stahl. “The Decolonization of the Arms 
Trade: Britain and the Regulation of Exports to the Middle East,” History of Global Arms Transfer, vol. 7 (2019): 4.  
 
26Report of the Sub-committee on Arms traffic, 10 Mar. 1917 in  Simon Ball’s “Britain and the Decline of the 
International Control of Small Arms in the Twentieth Century.” Journal of Contemporary History 47, no. 4 (October 
1, 2012): 818.  
 
27Daniel Stahl, “The Decolonization of the Arms Trade: Britain and the Regulation of Exports to the Middle East," 
History of Global Arms Transfer, vol. 7 (2019): 5.  
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he saw in the events leading to the Russian Revolution. British officials also shared similar 
concerns. They paid close attention to how the proliferation of weapons would affect the empire. 
As a result, the Indian Office, Foreign Office, and the War Office proposed to the British Cabinet 
to negotiate an international convention to regulate arms traffic. In the meantime, Britain needed 
to secure a victory against the Ottoman empire, bringing it to negotiations while strategically 
orchestrating the end of Ottoman rule in the Middle East.  
The Palestinian and Iraqi campaigns delivered devastating defeats that weakened the 
Ottoman empire, but the War Cabinet determined the possible post-war outcomes.  In London, 
the War cabinet had to make a critical decision to sign a peace treaty with the Ottomans or 
merely an armistice. The peace treaties were unreliable because they demanded an immediate 
decision that would settle preexisting conflicts, and the post-war objectives would have to be 
discussed as well. The truce was a favorable option because it made the Ottomans relinquish all 
rights to weapons immediately. Additionally, the successful armistice with Bulgaria – due to the 
collapse of the Russian Empire after the Bolshevik revolution – allowed the British to take over 
vital military posts and economic resources. Armistices provided more rapid solutions than fully-
fledged peace treaties. Arthur Balfour – Foreign Minister, imperial advocate, and architect of the 
famous Balfour Declaration – drafted many versions of the ceasefire in which he emphasized the 
military importance. In a letter to the war cabinet, Balfour stated  
At the present moment, military considerations must be held to dominate the situation. 
Though, therefore, the final terms of peace will have to be settled at the Peace 
Conference, we must, in the meanwhile, be content with an armistice, as in the case of 
Bulgaria….Mesopotamia would cease to be pawns at the Peace Conference. They would 
be entirely wrested from the hands of the Turks, and although the Allies would still be at 








Britain was able to occupy acquired land and use military resources like proxy fighters in the 
Arabian peninsula and Central Asia to protect this land and agitate Ottoman infantry units. Post-
war aims and obligations were saved for the future, but the truce legitimized British presence in 
the region.   
Ultimately, the Mudros armistice was an essential political document and statement about 
British interest in the area.29 By 1918, the Arab revolt was successful, pushing the Ottomans 
back further and leading to negotiations that transformed the Middle East.  On October 30, 1918, 
the bilateral talks between Britain and the Ottoman Empire commenced near the Greek Island of 
Lemnos. General Rauf Bey (representative of the Ottoman empire) and Admiral Somerset Arthur 
Gough-Calthorpe (representative of the combined Allied powers) discussed the conditions of 
surrender aboard the HMS Agamemnon. Britain immediately demanded, and accepted, that the 
Ottomans relinquish all of their territory in the Middle East. Specifically, in clauses eleven and 
seventeen, the Mudros armistice announced that "By stipulating the withdrawal and/or surrender 
of Ottoman garrisons from Persia and Transcaucasia, [the Ottomans would relinquish] the Hejaz, 
Assir, Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia."30 The armistice asked for the demobilization of 
Ottoman land forces, strategic access to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles for the Allied Powers, 
and all Ottoman garrisons were to be placed under Allied occupation.31 As a result, British troops 
immediately occupied the Mosul vilayet (province) after the armistice was signed. Additionally, 
the treaty was a bilateral agreement between the British and Ottomans that excluded France, 
 
29Briton Busch. Mudros to Lausanne: Britain’s Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923. (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 1976), 13.  
 
30Sean McMeekin. The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution and the Making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-
1923. (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 409.  
 
31Michael Provence. The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East. (Cambridge: 




creating tension between France and Britain in the region. Britain avoided calling these 
negotiations "peace agreements" because it required all allied members’ presence to solidify their 
interest in the area; the British did not inform the French.32 
However, things changed slightly between the Mudros Armistice and the Paris peace 
talks with the help of men like Lord George Curzon (the former viceroy of India) and Arthur 
Balfour. They both saw France as a strategic partner in the region. Balfour believed the real 
threat was the United States and Woodrow Wilson’s idea of "self-determination," which 
resonated with many nationalist organizations in the Middle East. In that context, Lord Curzon 
saw France as more of an ally. In a speech to the Eastern Committee in 1918, he believed they 
shared similar interests but understood that if France acquired Syria, they were the only Great 
Power that could "cut the road to India."33 
In order to ease the tension between these two empires after the First World War, the St. 
Germain conference was an international conversation about arms trafficking but functioned as a 
precursor to imperial tutelage – before the League of Nations formally established mandate 
tutelage – over colonized territories.  Before St. Germain, disarmament treaties were common, 
but this treaty expanded the scope of an established international topic. The predecessor to the St. 
Germain treaty is the 1890 Brussels convention. Although the 1890 convention aimed to end 
human trafficking and slavery in Africa, as opposed to arms prohibition, it was a predecessor to 
the St. Germain treaty in its internationalist appeal and the regional spotlight cast over the non-
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European regions.34 Similarly, the St. Germain treaty aimed to ensure the stability of European 
possessions in colonial territories, and the treaty itself was meant to highlight the instability in 
the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. St. Germain was an attempt at collective security that 
required a broad definition of what disarmament meant. The arms committee (formed by 
delegates from Britain, France, and the US) tasked imperial powers and small states to limit – 
and in the case of colonial territories, outlaw – land, sea, and air weapons systems; their 
production, acquisition, deployment, and use.35 
Within the broader agreement, discussion on arms reflected Britain’s colonial objectives 
and rhetoric about the prohibition of arms transfers and sales in the Middle East. For example, 
the committee outlined Britain's future negotiating position: to persuade other powers "not to 
dispose of, by sale or otherwise in any circumstances whatever of the surplus stocks of arms and 
ammunition...to regulate the sale and manufacture of...automatic pistols...under a system of rigid 
State control and prohibit the export of these articles to any destination except under Government 
license."36 The colonial purpose of St. Germain was restricting arms to the non-western world by 
banning arms shipments to any territory under mandate tutelage. Aiming to prevent the arming 
of insurgent movements, St. Germain declared Africa, the Arabian Peninsula through Iran and 
north to Transcaucasia, and all Asian sections of the Ottoman Empire to be prohibited areas. In 
these "prohibited areas," arms licensing was much stricter, and ruling authorities determined 
which ships and ports performed arms deliveries.  
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British delegates to the arms committee, like Mark Sykes and C.H. Bateman, argued that 
the influx of small arms from Europe had two consequences. First, they immediately enabled 
indigenous populations to step up the violence of their encounters. Second, guns raised the 
specter of “Islamic” revolt against Britain across an arc of crises stretching from the Red Sea to 
the Bay of Bengal. The British military was not prepared for the first consequence and feared the 
second.37 In any case, whether they controlled the arms traffic or not, British officials speculated 
that German and Turkish forces issued immense masses of modern arms to natives in Persia, 
Arabia, and Turkey and believed there were enough arms that every indigenous person had a 
rifle.38 
With the proliferation of weapons in the Middle East and the wartime experience of many 
Arab soldiers, the 1920 revolt in Iraq was one of the most costly and threatening skirmishes 
during British occupation in the Middle East. By the end of the Great War, famine and economic 
strife had contributed to a demographic shift, in which nomadic tribes from the west began 
settling in semi-urban towns along the Euphrates to find work, stable food sources, and other 
resources.  Still, Captain Arnold Wilson and his administration began imposing high taxes – for 
infrastructural projects – on the various tribal populations that had no money and refused to pay a 
percentage of their livestock.39 Indiscriminate violence, unnecessary arrests and the subjugation 
of local religious figures because of their anti-British rhetoric became catalysts for anti-colonial 
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resistance. It was at this point that different cities openly revolted. For example, in Rumaytha, 
locals destroyed a bridge and dismantled a rail line. Captain H.V. Bragg responded by sending 
engineers to repair the rail line, but local people fired on them. Captain Bragg brought 527 men 
on July 4, who observed insurgents that "numbered over 2,500...[that] constructed trenches 
around the town."40 As a result, Bragg called in reinforcements from a nearby village. Fifteen 
hundred rebels ambushed Bragg's reinforcements while traveling to Rumaytha. Forty-three 
infantrymen were pronounced missing in action or dead, and sixteen British and Indian officers 
were reported injured. Successful insurgent operations such as this one were widespread in the 
early stages of the revolt, which eventually led to a cohesive urban and rural population that 
attempted to create a government structure to combat British colonialism.  
While mistreatment was the initial cause of the revolt, urban and rural populations came 
together because of a more global phenomenon, self-determination. Similar socioeconomic 
conditions in places like Egypt, Iran, and Turkey led to uprisings that inspired nationalists in Iraq 
to combat British occupation and sustain their autonomy.41 As villages like Najaf and Karbala 
saw military victories, Sayyid Muhsin Abu Tabikh, a Shi'i landowner, was declared the leader of 
the revolution along the Euphrates. He gained prominence after the battle of Abu Shkhair, where 
he acquired British heavy artillery (with sufficient ammunition) and light machine guns. Tabikh 
and his men used these weapons to inflict damaging firepower against the cruiser Firefly that 
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threatened the city of Kufa.42 They eventually captured Kifl and Diwanniyya, which led to 
Captain Arnold Wilson abandoning British military headquarters in Karbala to retreat to 
Baghdad.43 The absence of British forces and confiscated weapons allowed Tabikh to increase 
his political prestige and create a structured government. Formed out of the traditional elites of 
society, the Shi'i clergymen divided themselves into two councils. The military board oversaw all 
operations and took inventory of weapons and ammunition while the community council headed 
the local governance. There was also the religious and city council, which managed tax 
collections and small police forces.44 Tabikh was appointed Mutassarif (governor) and oversaw 
every committee. With a highly structured government, he could ration his weapons and food 
while sending excess to other cities in the Upper and Lower Euphrates, expanding his political 
influence beyond his local domain. These actions would eventually backfire as British strategy 
switched from ground to air assaults to pressure tribes to surrender their weapons and end the 
insurgency.   
The switch from ground to air assaults not only weakened Tabikh militarily but also 
politically in Karbala and Najaf. Returning to General Aylmer Haldane’s account of his 
operations in the Euphrates region, the night before his breach on the cities, a portion of his 
battalion was attacked. The next day, Haldane ordered five infantry battalions, three batteries of 
field artillery, and ten airplanes to encircle the city.45 These extreme measures continued, but 
inhabitants of the two holy cities were given an ultimatum to either surrender and relinquish all 
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arms to the British or face more damage. Therefore, on November 16, 1920, the tribes in Najaf 
surrendered, and Britain demanded the tribes deliver four-thousand rifles and four-hundred-
thousand rounds of ammunition. Furthermore, tribes were to hand in modern rifles – notably 
British and German rifles raided from battle sites during World War I.46 As a result of their 
surrender, Sayyid Tabikh was exiled from Iraq while other local figures were exiled or executed. 
Britain didn't want to decimate the religious cities, so they replaced the local figures with pro-
British allies and confiscated resources such as sheep, goats, cattle, horses, and donkeys as 
collateral for any arms that were not delivered.  
Sayyid Tabikh’s revolt and others like it caused significant financial strain and exposed 
the imperial government's weakness. Cities that were initially pro-British, like Samawa, were 
given lighter confiscation rules. They paid no taxes, turned in 2,400 rifles, and were not 
obligated to hand over notables. The condition of the rifles were not always specified in the 
negotiation.47 During Haldane's tenure, there was an increase in fines levied, and between 48,000 
and 53,000 rifles were handed over to British troops before March 31, 1921.48 According to 
Charles Tilly, gun seizures after rebellions are the government’s way of delegitimizing the 
possession of firearms outside of military institutions.49 The problem, however, was that a 
legitimate government didn’t exist in Iraq after the First World War ended, and Britain did not 
have the personnel to confiscate all of the weapons in Iraq. This war continued from 1920 to 
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1921, costing the British forty million pounds, roughly four hundred casualties (ten thousand 
Iraqi casualties), and threatened direct military rule in Iraq. To reduce the cost of military 
expenditures and halt the influx of weapons in Iraq, Britain had to create a perception that Iraq 
would be an independent state with Faisal as king, and create local relationships with shaykhs 
and notables to stop arms smuggling in Iraq.  
Back at home, the catastrophic and economically irresponsible approach to the Iraqi 
revolt appalled the general public. British citizens demanded to know 'how much longer are 
valuable lives to be sacrificed in the vain endeavor to impose upon the Arab population an 
elaborate and expensive administration which they never asked for and do not want?" while also 
arguing "We are spending sums in Mesopotamia and in Persia which may well reach a hundred 
million pounds this year' in support of what it termed 'the foolish policy of the Government in the 
Middle East.'"50 Britain's mandates began under military occupation and direct rule with the War 
ministry in full control. However, direct rule and military occupation were too expensive and 
unpopular both in the imperial capital and in the mandates. After the Cairo Conference in 1921, 
governance shifted from military rule to mandate oversight that controlled security, local politics, 
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Oil, Economy, and Selective Re-armament, 1920-1922 
By the 1920s, the connection between Britain’s economic, political, and security interests 
influenced the state-building project in Iraq, which represented the first stage of selective 
disarmament. British policymakers developed a keen interest in the northern part of the Arabian 
Peninsula. The goal was to secure an overland route linking the Mediterranean to the Persian 
Gulf to ensure rail, oil, and air transport. To do this, Britain had to figure out how to halt 
resistance in Iraq and appease its Hashemite allies from the First World War. This conundrum 
led to the Cairo conference within the next year. The reason why the meeting took place was that 
from February 1921, the Cabinet met to consider the creation of an Inter-Departmental 
Committee, appointed by the Prime Minister David Lloyd George to oversee the mandated 
territories in the Middle East. Lastly, this conference summoned colonial High Commissioners 
from Somaliland and Aden to address issues and craft a centralized government for the 
Palestinian, Jordanian, and Iraqi mandates that would appeal to British interest.51 Britain would 
use this centralized government as an instrument to selectively re-arm certain tribal groups and 
 
51For a comprehensive history of the Cairo Conference see Aaron Kileman’s Foundations of British Policy in the 
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example see Karol Sorby’s “Britain’s Pressing Need for the Establishment of an Iraqi army” in the Journal of Asian 
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create an Arab army in Iraq that was adequately sized to secure British interests but not threaten 
British occupation.  
The Cairo Conference of 1921 was designed to solve defense inadequacies after the Iraqi 
revolt in 1920, and the creation of an Arab government in Iraq and Jordan with Faisal I and 
Abdullah I as prospective kings in Jordan and Iraq. To secure the communication lines between 
Mesopotamia, other mandate territories, and, most importantly, India, the British had to solve the 
threat of Bedouin nomads that possessed arms that could lead to disruption. Both the military and 
the colonial government understood the danger. Winston Churchill helped alter the British 
expenditures in the region, advocating for the reinstitution of Hussein's sons as local leaders in 
Iraq and Jordan. The most important topic was how to cut the cost of occupying Mesopotamia. 
Two committees joined to discuss the matter, one political and one military. The solution was to 
shift from infantry-based operations in Iraq to Winston Churchill's air force-based strategy. Sir 
Hugh Trenchard was skeptical about the idea because it would take a year to implement, and 
Britain needed quicker solutions to cut the defense budget. However, Churchill's air-force 
defense strategy worked, eliminating seventy-five percent of Middle Eastern expenditures and 
reducing it from forty-five million pounds to eleven million pounds by 1922.52 This defensive 
strategy created an opportunity for the imperial government to shield Iraq from other regional 
conflicts, like the growing power of Ibn Saud in the Arabian Peninsula, while protecting their 
domestic interests.53 
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On March 16, 1921, the fourth meeting between the military and political committees 
discussed the construction of a cross-desert route with the potential of building railways and oil 
pipelines. To secure this development of railways and oil pipelines, the British had to create a 
pathway for airplanes to fly between the desert regions safely. However, the Sinai desert and 
southern Iraq were dangerous.54 The British proposed paying subsidies to tribes that lived along 
the cross-desert route to improve its commercial and military value. The Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company would benefit greatly from the creation, and safety, of the desert route. According to 
Sir Percy Cox 
[He] agreed with Sir Robert Samuel as to the necessity for the railway. He pointed out 
that the matter could hardly be allowed to stand over indefinitely. It was essential that a 
definite policy should be laid down in order that commercial interests might be in a 
position to consider taking over the railways in Iraq. Until the view of the British 
government had been made clear…the oil might be sent over the alternative route via 
Nisibin through the French zone, where no doubt very heavy transit charges would be 
levied.55 
 
Convincing the Royal government to approve this railroad was an easy task because it was 
necessary to sustain governance in Mesopotamia. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company predicted that 
revenue would exceed one-million pounds per year. The mandate government of Iraq saw a 
percentage in their civil governmental fund to provide further subsidies for tribes living in the 
region. The newly formed government under King Faisal would also receive funds from the oil 
revenue.56 These commercial interests coincided with the necessity for state security to ensure 
safe communication lines and oil extraction.   
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The transition from military to colonial government demanded the need for a security 
apparatus against nomadic tribes that threatened the development of new economic and 
infrastructural projects. In the papers relating to the transfer of Middle Eastern affairs to the 
Colonial Office, Cabinet notes between Milner, Montague, and Churchill critically analyze the 
potential for a desert railway and other transportation roads. However, the notes highlighted an 
existing threat in this project, which was the Bedouin tribes.  
The desert is favorable for the operations of aircraft, and in most places can be crossed by 
wheeled transport. The population is essentially Arab: nearly every man possesses arms. 
The Arabs are the weightiest element in the population of Mesopotamia…The Bedouin, 
or nomad Arab is most likely to give trouble: he is used to a continual but fairly harmless 
warfare of raids, skirmishes, and funding fights. In conflict with regular troops, he 
confines himself in general to guerilla methods.57 
 
The British government was willing to use planes and machine guns that enabled British troops 
to disarm and quell any rebellion without severe damage to British infantrymen. In order to 
secure air and wheeled transports in the desert, along with Britain’s economic endeavors, the 
appearance of a stable-indigenous government was the theoretical solution to the nomadic and 
other civil problems within Iraq.  
The shift from military to mandatory rule, after the Cairo Conference in 1921, resulted in 
the creation of a dependent indigenous government that aided British interest in the control of 
security, local politics, and law. The installation of Faisal as King of Iraq, as a constitutional 
monarch, created a state with greater definition, but the distinctive patterns of its politics began 
to emerge.58 Son of Hussein bin Ali – the leader of the Arab revolt in 1916 with origins from the 
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Arabian peninsula – King Faisal was considered an outsider. In the opinion of men like Sir 
Arnold Talbot Wilson and Percy Cox – British High Commissioners – having a neutral figure 
like Faisal was a great candidate that could serve as a "pliant instrument."59 He was a war hero 
who had led successful campaigns against the Ottomans during World War I and championed 
Arab nationalism. Still, it was evident that Britain only wanted a King to reign in Iraq and not 
govern it. Faisal had little rapport with local Sunni and Shi'i clerics in the early development of 
his government, which is a testament to the fact that creating an "Iraqi" identity was going to be a 
top-down project.60  His government was not rooted in traditional legitimacy from the people. 
Instead, his ability to rule derived from Britain. Theoretically, Britain believed that an Arab King 
could consolidate his rule over the country and promote an Iraqi identity through legislation and 
state-tribal alliances. Ultimately, this theory on the development of Iraqi identity and 
construction of the state stemmed from Britain’s own historical understanding of the evolution of 
their society.61 
Before discussing some of the ways in which Britain consolidated power for Faisal, but 
most importantly itself, it is essential to briefly discuss the opposing opinions from his subjects.  
In the beginning, there wasn't a strong bond between Faisal and his subjects. Some of the officers 
who had fought alongside Faisal against the Ottomans during the war were not fond of Faisal's 
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reign in 1921. However, this did not stop them from being a part of Faisal's government and 
army.62 While sectarian differences were a problem for some, former Ottoman-military officers 
and even civilians were not fond of what Faisal represented as an associate of the British. For 
example, Iraqis appealed to the Ottoman Caliph "for the deliverance of Iraq from 
foreigners…and from Faisal and his father who came to dominate over the Muslims under the 
cloak of Arab nationalism in disobedience of the order of God which says: 'The believers are 
brothers.'"63  
The opinions expressed by Faisal’s colleagues and former Ottoman officers were 
legitimate, considering the type of role that British officials would have while working with the 
new government. Sir Percy Cox, the High Commissioner of Iraq, held most of the power despite 
Britain's transition from direct to indirect rule after the devastating revolt in 1920. He could veto 
laws within Iraq’s constitution, jail politicians, rig elections, institute martial law, execute 
political dissidents, and send people to detention without charge, trials, and prison sentences.  
The most notable piece of legislation enacted in Iraq was the Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes 
Regulation (influenced by the Government of India Act). This civil regulation gave rural 
communities the power to settle intertribal disputes without violence, provided Sheiks with the 
ability to levy taxes in the name of the government (as opposed to collecting taxes for their 
community), and pushed tribal leaders to hand over criminals or agitators that possessed illegal 
 
62Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old  Landed and 
Commercial Class and of its Communists, Ba'athists, and Free Officers, 320.  
 
63From the Iraqi Police File No. 239 “Al-Hizb al-Watani” (The National Party) in Batatu’s The Old Social Classes 
and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed and Commercial Class and of its 




firearms.64 Britain's policy to work with local sheiks and officials was instrumental in reshaping 
the tribal hierarchies. 
The collaboration between the High Commissioner, King Faisal, and a parliament ruled 
by notables from tribal communities changed society in Iraq. At the local level, these mandate 
institutions abolished former Ottoman elected municipal councils and depended on unelected 
local dignitaries to maintain order.65 At the local level, the central administration utilized their 
power and extension through municipal courts to draft laws against insurrections, smuggling 
(anything from drugs to guns), and illegal migration.66 An excellent example of this relationship 
between colonial government, law, and its extension into local politics is in the small, strategic 
town of Zubair. This town would become a site for infrastructural projects like railways to 
reinforce communication lines between military bases. Still, because of the "lawlessness" of 
Arab tribes, Sir Percy Cox sought allies in this town. In a proposal to the town of Zubair, Sir 
Percy Cox notified Shaikh Ibrahim that he could remain in power if he pledged allegiance to 
Faisal's government and instituted "a) A regular Municipality to be established…b) Government 
Customs post at Zubair…c) Revenue dues to be collected at Government rates and credited to 
Government treasury…d) All taxes not specifically ordered by government but collected by the 
Shaikh to cease."67 Negotiations created alliances between the colonial and tribal governments, 
which sometimes guaranteed a reward. In the case of Sheik Ibrahim, the colonial government 
provided him with weapons and the additional political task of protecting infrastructural projects 
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against nomadic and encroaching tribes. Even though Britain restricted the availability of arms to 
entities outside of the government, this partnership with Sheik Ibrahim signified that arms 
control was selective and came with security conditions, even if it meant working with former 
enemies.   
Another aspect to selective arms control are the debates on and the creation of the Iraqi 
army from 1921 to 1922, which was supposed to represent the consolidation of state authority, 
common defense, and national identity. However, it was difficult to unite the Iraqi mandate 
under British control. Britain faced a serious problem, which was how to create an identity and a 
nationalist ideology that could weld this fractured country into a state while maintaining their 
occupation. Furthermore, creating an organized state resulted in an Iraq army that relied on the 
British army, military advisers, and the Royal Air Force. The army provided Faisal and his 
government some autonomy. Still, Britain retained military and security privileges over Iraqi 
communication and intelligence to safeguard their defense before the defense of the Iraqi nation. 
From training to arms proliferation, the entire development of the legitimate Iraqi force was 
under British control.  
Britain’s project to consolidate and centralize arms within the hands of the state were met 
with some constraints.  The High Commissioners were aware of the constraints they were 
working within, creating a nation with a "national spirit" while balancing its self-interests.68 For 
example, the second High Commissioner in Iraq, Sir Henry Dobbs, was at the center of 
balancing these conflicting ideas. According to Dobbs, after the revolt of 1920, Iraq was a 
country without an indigenous central authority or any structured or functional institutions.69 
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Creating an army would bring order to a "lawless" state and cultivate a homogenous population 
with a national spirit. It would also promote people from different ethnic backgrounds to serve 
with each other for the sake of the Iraqi state and internal security – even though this same 
concept occurred under the Ottoman empire with the creation of its military schools across the 
former empire. Britain could utilize this army, and the new Iraqi identity, to combat internal 
resistance and those who opposed the state, while paying them cheaper wages than actual British 
soldiers.70 Despite paying Iraqi soldiers less than their British counterparts, Faisal believed that 
an Iraqi army was vital to maintain his power and create security against opposing forces 
internally and externally.  
From Faisal's perspective and his most loyal officers' perspective, they wanted a 
conscripted army to represent a larger transnational appeal to convey a strong Arab state.71 This 
conscripted army worried Dobbs and other British officials. Dobbs believed that the combination 
of Iraqi nationalists based in Baghdad and Faisal’s conception of a transnational Arab army 
would result in open and cohesive conflict against the British military, which would further 
exacerbate their resources in Iraq.72 The solution was to place restrictions on military 
development and provide British advisers that supervised and reported on Iraqi internal 
developments while training and educating troops.   
The conferences and meetings at the end of World War I altered British interest in the 
Middle East. Now, the colonial government was tasked with protecting its interest and creating a 
legitimate-indigenous government that altered the relationship to its subjects. In a Weberian 
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framework, the creation of the army and indigenous government (in collaboration with imperial 
hawks like Dobbs and Cox) would offer institutions that could respond to internal and regional 
disputes within a particular territory, legitimizing their use of force and violence.73 The state was 
the center of gravity that fabricated an Iraqi identity and monopolized violence.74  
Consequentially, this coercive state power challenged the existing political order, 
rendering tribal community structures illegitimate and threatening to Britain's "civilization 
mission" in Iraq unless these tribal communities partnered with the mandatory government.75  
The state-building process in Iraq required disarming rural communities; however, this process 
did not replicate the solutions established in the Cairo Conference or the guidelines of St. 
Germain. The colonial government demarcated legitimate versus illegitimate arms trade, while 
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Disarmament: Tribal Alliances, Minority Units, and Military Doctrine, 1923-1924 
As the Faisal-British relationship began to crumble over the logistics of an Arab army, 
Britain returned to the idea of security alliances with rural communities. Theoretically, Britain 
believed these alliances ensured security, especially during times of civil unrest; however, tribal 
alliances failed in some cases, especially when tribes attempted to leverage their position for 
more money and weapons. As the state expanded its sovereignty into rural communities through 
legislation and assistance, their efforts failed in the case of the Dhafir tribe in the lower 
Euphrates in 1923. The mandate government initially despised the Dhafir community because of 
their role in the 1920 revolt; however, they were a powerful tribe that had successful campaigns 
against the British military. After the uprising, Britain needed to foster an alliance with the 
Dhafir to take on another tribe adjacent to Basra, the Muntafiq. The Muntafiq threatened British 
control in Basra because of their stockpiled weapons totaling 30,000 rifles even two years after 
the revolt.76  They were also a nomadic tribe that conducted raids in nearby towns because of 
their monopoly on horse-trading. Therefore, the Dhafir tribe allied with the colonial government, 
taking on the task of protecting the Basra-Nasiriya railway used to transport British-military 
supplies.  
Even though Britain was supposed to disarm tribal groups and create a centralized state, 
they supplied the Dhafir tribe with modern rifles and money to combat the Muntafiq, which 
 




became a problem instead of a solution. The Dhafir struggled in their skirmishes with the 
Muntafiq and suffered casualties, so they demanded that Britain interfere militarily and provide 
more money. Colonial officials reneged on their promise to supply the funds and military 
assistance due to budget cuts. As a result, the tribe dismantled sections of the Basra-Nasiriyah 
railway to force negotiations.77 In situations like this one, powerful tribes leveraged their military 
skills and threats to British infrastructure to extract more resources from the state. The strategy to 
buy and assist tribes in expanding sovereignty was perilous. The proliferation of "legitimate" 
arms to tribes to combat their enemies was not always stable. To create stability, the mandatory 
government introduced an alternative branch of the standing army that would meet specific 
domestic challenges to state authority in a fragmented country.78 This section will begin with a 
discussion about their solutions, which were an aggressive expansion of the military through 
minority troops and their collaboration with the British Royal Air Force, allowing the British 
government to sideline the existing Iraqi army.  While the new efforts to consolidate arms 
control within the state were viable solutions, they were met with resistance. The last part of this 
section highlights the multiple ways in which anti-British communities subverted state power 
and acquired, traded, and used “illegitimate” arms due to preexisting gun-smuggling networks. 
Ultimately, the early stages of selective (re)armament encapsulates the type of state-building 
project commenced in Iraq, where the state attempted to strip the subjugated population of their 
arms by creating an economy of force that is unrivaled.  
As discussed in the previous section, Britain and Faisal were at odds with the function of 
the Iraqi army, but various regional crises required an expanded military that was very different 
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from Faisal’s nationalist dream while more conducive to Britain’s aims. Winston Churchill was 
the mastermind behind an economic policy for British occupation and the formation of the Iraqi 
military. He proposed that Faisal could have his national army if it was capped at 10,000 
conscripted soldiers and served as an appendage to the British Royal Air Force, but the low 
conscription numbers caused an incoherent and frequently changing policy towards developing 
the Iraqi army.79 The compromise between Faisal and Churchill was the result of the Chanak 
crisis of 1922. Turkish forces wanted to push the Greek army out in this significant dispute, so 
they marched on British and French troops by infiltrating the neutral Dardanelle straits. This 
conflict provoked Churchill to think about the possibilities of a Turkish invasion from the north. 
Faisal was upset about his political predicament, addressing his concerns in a memorandum 
stating, "in this kingdom there are more than 100,000 rifles, whereas the government has only 
15,000."80  
The solution was to employ minorities, thus expanding the state's sovereignty and 
legitimizing a force of the army that was less threatening to British rule. To supplement the low 
personnel for the Iraqi national army, the British created levy units, which were a step below 
conscription. Local officials organized these units for local tasks like order and security, and 
recruited minorities – such as the Kurds and Assyrians – based on their loyalty to Britain. In 
some ways, the employment of minority groups legitimized the Iraqi state internationally from 
the League of Nations' perspective while staying faithful to their regional obligations. It provided 
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minority-auxiliary units with weapons and salaries that prevented them from picking up arms 
and turning them against the British to fight for self-determination.81 Their access to economic 
and military resources, making them legally armed with the expectation of halting possible 
Turkish invasions and interfering in revolts, put them in a position to advocate for greater 
autonomy, privileges, and protection from the state. 
A border dispute in Northern Iraq between Assyrians and Turkish villages, in 1923, 
demonstrates the relationship between "legal" or "legitimate” force and its connection to 
autonomy. The Turkish ambassador communicated to Sir W. Tyrrell that several Nestorian 
Christians were located and inciting violence in the village of Aroche. Şevki Paşa – the Turkish 
ambassador – reported that some of these Nestorians were former Iraqi levies and that they 
crossed the frontier in August of 1923, firing on Turkish patrols. While this report was 
intentionally dishonest and speculative from the Turks' perspective, this correspondence 
discloses the British Permanent Frontier Commission's procedures for former levy members. It 
states  
As regards to the permission accorded to men from the Iraq levies to retain their arms, I 
have the honour to inform you that the retention of rifles and ammunition by members of 
the levies on discharge from that force is conditional upon their giving an undertaking not 
to take such rifles outside Iraq, and also to return to the colours in defence of Iraq if 
called upon to do so. With a view to the strict enforcement of this undertaking, a further 
warning against taking rifles outside the boundaries of Iraq has recently been circulated 
to all members of the force. I may add that His Majesty's Government will be glad to 
receive from the Turkish Government information of any well authenticated cases of 
Assyrians (who have been members of the levies) entering Turkish territory in possession 
of arms, in order that action in conformity with the law may be taken against the 
offenders on their return to Iraq.82 
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The British military officials simply denied this report by the Turkish ambassador. They claimed 
that their information on terrorism from groups in the village of Aroche on Turkish villages 
along the frontier was false. Sir Austen Chamberlain reassured the Turkish delegates that "all the 
settlers are under the supervision of the competent local authorities in Iraq, and there is no reason 
to suppose that they will violate the frontier."83 Whether the British denial of this event is true or 
false goes beyond this project. Still, it is essential to note the language of monopolized violence 
and the distinction between state arms and "lawless" possession of arms. Mandate borders 
condition the legitimacy to possess arms and enact violence. Britain clarified that this structure is 
necessary to control violence and limit its execution in cross-border disputes. Even if auxiliary 
troops violate this oath or obligation to the army, troops can endure some type of legal 
punishment for utilizing weapons outside of the colonial-military institution.  
 Ultimately, minority-auxiliary units were very loyal to Britain, and their role after 1923 
expanded exponentially. Levied units became the "shock-absorbers" of internal disputes while 
having access to a formidable war machine, the RAF, and modern weaponry.84 The Iraqi army 
and British levy units were institutions where arms trade and possession were legitimate and 
considered stable despite the friction and contrary opinions between Faisal and Britain. These 
ground troops were excellent for security and police purposes when it came to confiscating and 
enacting punishments against illegitimate arms holders and agitators, which is evident within the 
developing British military doctrine of the time.  
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 By 1923, the expansion of the military through minority-levy units provided Britain with 
some hope of consolidating arms control in Iraq. At the same time, the RAF was theorizing about 
air and ground force doctrine to halt the influx of weapons into Iraq – on top of military doctrine 
solving other regional and global threats of war. These doctrines reveal the state's methods to 
monopolize violence by punitively punishing those who challenged the dichotomy of illegitimate 
and legitimate possessions of arms. The RAF was initially used to circumnavigate rough 
geographical terrain by 1923.85 However, in the case of Captain J.B. Glubb, he began theorizing 
about how combined ground and air assaults created social discipline. Glubb's doctrine aimed to 
destroy property and disorganize the enemy's life habits through irregularly timed raids by day 
and night.86 Glubb justified this swift and destructive air tactic because of the drawbacks of lone 
ground assaults. As demonstrated throughout this paper, infantry units in Iraq have been 
outnumbered in many skirmishes, leading to the colonial government's delegitimization and 
military alliances between rural communities. Therefore, Glubb's combined air and ground 
assaults strove to prevent these "regrettable incidents" and provide ground assaults with air 
support anywhere in the country so that the government maintained legitimacy.87 This entire 
document is a fascinating explanation of the political strategy inherent in combined air and 
ground assaults. It focuses on the practicality of restoring colonial legitimacy while causing 
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enough damage to prevent rural communities from rebelling and engaging in illegal activities. In 
the case of Samawah, one can see Glubb's doctrine in the context of state arms confiscation in 
the last few months of 1923.  
Despite their role and the outcome of the 1920 revolt, tribes like Samawah, the Barakats, 
and al-Sufran circumvented government surveillance because of their position on the Euphrates 
river. After the uprising, Britain could only extract a gun tax from these tribes until 1923. When 
the RAF established a military doctrine, gun-taxing acquired a punitive strategy that expanded 
the scope and geographical outreach to surveil, enforce taxation, and crack down on tribes near 
the Euphrates river, adjacent to strategic communication lines and railways, with large stockpiles 
of weapons due to the weak presence of local government.88 The Barkats and the al-Sufran 
pushed the limits of British disarmament campaigns even though gun taxes and the RAF were 
designed to exert force and increase British mandatory power in Iraq.89 
Both tribes refused to give up their guns and stopped paying taxes. As a result, they faced 
the consequences and were subjected to multiple days of punitive punishment. On the first day, 
the RAF flew over Samawah, releasing pamphlets with demands from the local government, but 
the Barkat and al-Sufran tribes refused. The next day there were combined assaults of air 
bombing and incendiary devices. This episode confirmed that airplanes could seek out 
disobedient tribes wherever they fled.90 Britain proposed another set of demands, but both tribes 
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refused and were subjected to two more days of aerial bombardment. Eventually, various tribes 
began handing in their weapons as they saw their homes, livestock, and crops destroyed. From 
1923 onward, punitive punishment through ground or air assault became the norm.91  The RAF – 
formerly sidelined during World War I – provided low costs for British military operations in 
Iraq and protected the lives of government forces. Therefore, the institution multiplied and 
became essential for asserting and defending the state's sovereignty and was a favorite for 
preventing resistance and arms smuggling. The British army, levy units, and the RAF became 
viable instruments of state coercion and expansion. However, even though the state managed to 
expand its sovereignty from 1921-1924, their claim to violence and legitimacy wavered in areas 
where gun-smuggling had been essential to rural economies before the mandate government.  
Returning to a familiar story, the Dhafir tribe resisted British colonialism when their 
demands were unmet, but they also cultivated trade networks with surrounding tribes in a 
situation from 1923. However, in this example, Dhafir became the arms suppliers within 
intertribal disputes in locations between Samawah and Khidt. As opposed to settling the conflict 
in the courts under the Tribal Civil and Criminal Response regulation, tribal parties were 
stockpiling weapons from the Dhafir tribe to resolve their problems. In a military investigative 
report, a British official noted that,  
A number of rifles which were being smuggled over from Damascus, were recently 
captured by Dhafir raiders, who are known to be selling them to the tribes between 
Samawah and Khidt. A body of police was sent to collect the rifles from the Dhafir on the 
October 26 but after parleying with one of the headmen. Manna al-Suwait, found that the 
orders of the mutessarif could not be executed without more support than was available. 
On the following day, however, the police succeeded in capturing 434 camels, and the 
headmen have been warned that they will be sold if the rifles are not handed in within ten 
days. Previous to this episode, information was received that a Shammar Sheikh Ibn 
Shuraijim, whose section is camped 3 miles south of Samawah on the Saklawiyah Canal 
was also in possession of some of the looted rifles. The police attempted to raid him, but 
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a section of the Zayyad interposed in a manner so threatening that the commandant of 
police considered it wiser to withdraw, lest he should find himself embroiled in 
operations on a large scale against the Zayyad tribe. The administrative inspector is of the 
opinion that no action against the Zayyad can safely be undertaken unless the local police 
force can be strongly supported by other arms.92 
 
There is a struggle between legitimate authority and weapons in this example. The Dhafir has 
looted rifles and dispersed them into other rural areas. Weapons permitted the Dhafir to 
determine the outcome of intertribal disputes and overrode the legal system's authority and the 
Tribal Civil and Criminal Response regulation. Thus, the Dhafir tribe possessed but also 
dispersed immense economic and military power along the Euphrates river that disrupted the 
connection between local politics and the mandate government. Lastly, any attempt by the local 
police to interfere was threatened by Zayyadi resistance, so the RAF and other institutions of 
state violence were called in to reinstate order.  
However, the situation did not disappear, which is evident in 1924. The Kubaisah was a 
desert port village that was important for trade during Ottoman and mandate rule.  Desert ports 
evaded state surveillance, and the British army rarely policed this region unless there were 
uprisings. The village of Kubaisah produced and sold crops to nomadic tribes that frequently 
traded with them, such as the Bedouins. After an investigation into arms traffic between mandate 
territories, an anonymous informant reported that Bedouin convoys brought rifles and 
ammunition through the desert, which were usually hidden in the packing of "innocent" 
merchandise and sold to receiving agents in bazaars who would in turn sell them to tribes 
throughout Iraq.93 There was a steady infiltration of Turkish Mausers and occasionally French 
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and British rifles. It was estimated that roughly 1,000 rifles were exported and traded from 
Kubaisah to towns further south in Rahhliyah and Shifathah. This type of trade was unusual for a 
city that mostly produced dates and other crops. While the report does not indicate the weapons' 
prices and the exchanges, firearms created a new economic market by being disguised and 
entangled with ordinary markets.94 The report did not note whether or not the Kubaisah used 
these weapons to resist state authority, but it's interesting to see how Turkish Mausers created an 
economic market for them. Kubaisah is one of many examples where "legitimate" economic 
systems like taxation and state assistance are supposed to garnish authority, but rural 
communities created their separate "legitimate" financial systems. Gun trade networks were not 
just used to develop alternative forms of economics, but also established alternative means of 
force against the state and sometimes other tribes.  Dhafir and Kubaisah are among many 
examples where tribes subverted state power. In the example of the Dhafir, however, it is an 


















Frontier Zones: Disarmament and Its Limits, 1925-1927 
The remainder of this section studies Anglo-French relations during the 1925 Syrian uprising 
to highlight how contested spaces like the frontier zone in combination with arms proliferation 
exhausted and limited Anglo-French diplomacy and sovereignty within their respective 
territories.95 Frontiers and borderlands have always been contested spaces throughout the history 
of the Ottoman empire and afterward. European intervention and imperial rivalries in the 
nineteenth century resulted in Ottoman-state expansion and control into the Balkan and Persian 
frontiers.  Internally, the Ottoman state responded to frontier challenges by increasing influence 
over tribal villages and bureaucratization in its predominantly Arab territories. Developing 
sovereignty and injecting military, economic, and juridical legitimacy into these regions was a 
daunting task that often sparked resistance. Even after the Ottoman empire ended, the British 
colonial government would face similar challenges, especially in cross-border diplomacy with 
France. During times of revolt, nationalists, tribal nomads, and ex-Ottoman officers envisioned 
transnational acts of resistance in which they often migrated across borders, and their weapons 
would follow. Therefore, this section begins with a brief discussion of Ottoman governance in 
frontier spaces to demonstrate the continuous problems that the mandate powers would face in 
the interwar period.  
 
95The Syrian Revolt is not the only major conflict that threatened British or French security. As discussed above, the 
wars going on in Turkey and Saudi Arabia also threatened the borderlands as well. However, there is not enough 
room in this paper to elaborate on this issue and the various ways they handled it.  
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Before discussing the relationship between frontier zones and Anglo-French relations in the 
Middle East, it is important to briefly discuss how the Ottomans governed integrated frontiers, 
like Transjordan, into the modern state in the late nineteenth century. Under Ottoman control, the 
central government initially classified Transjordan as a frontier zone in the Ottoman empire, and 
relatively autonomous tribes governed this area. However, European encroachment into frontier 
spaces like North Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Caucus region destabilized the preexisting 
political structure and led to a dramatic reformation in frontier governance. Beginning in 1867, 
Transjordan came under direct Ottoman rule in three phases. First, the Ottoman military 
intervened and violently subdued tribes and chiefdoms that controlled the tax system and 
agricultural production. Second, institutional integration in education, juridical districts, and 
infrastructural systems was also important. The schools converted tribesmen from nomads and 
semi-nomads to professionalized state workers. Simultaneously, the juridical systems created a 
stable tax system that paid for communication networks, railroads, and ports that further 
connected the frontier directly to the state.96 Lastly, the nationalization of conscription and the 
construction of mosques are actual examples of cultural integration. Conscription was a way for 
the government to create loyal Ottoman subjects. Simultaneously, the mosques served as a 
cultural space that conveyed the Sultan (Abdul Hamid II) as a legitimate ruler and religious 
authority.97 Transjordan's institutional and cultural integration into the Ottoman empire 
demonstrates how the state faced a real need to extend its sovereignty to the limits of its 
territorial boundaries. Another way of thinking about this frontier example is through 
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"interpenetration.” Interpenetration is when a frontier opens in a given region, and the first 
representative of the intrusive community arrives; it closes when a single political authority has 
established hegemony over the zone.98 Simply speaking, frontiers are not ahistorical spaces but 
are constructed by state powers through the lens of open and closed (cultural or military 
hegemony) capabilities to enforce their sovereignty. However, as Ottomanization was underway, 
subjects in Transjordan demanded more rights when confronted with food and job shortages, 
which crystallized into the 1910 Karak revolt.  
The Karak revolt was a direct result of resource shortages and the Young Turk regime's 
political instability. After overthrowing Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1908, due to his suspension of 
the constitution and parliament thirty years earlier, the Young Turks assumed power. However, 
the increase in state control through law and the Ottomans’ intolerance to local particularism led 
to widespread discontent among settled peasant-communities in Transjordan.99 The Young Turks 
regime deprived nomadic Bedouin tribes of essential resources that the Hamidian government 
had provided initially. Furthermore, nomadic groups were always under surveillance by state 
forces, which made raiding almost impossible after heavy taxation against them. This illegal 
behavior pushed nomadic tribes to reinstate earlier forms of economic revenue, which was gun 
smuggling.100 The Young Turks reversed “interpenetration” by isolating and neglecting the 
frontier, which then recreated an open area where tribal populations sought resources and trade 
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opportunities. 101 The weapons, revenue from gun sales, and similar anti-Ottoman sentiments 
expressed in the city and rural areas allowed nomadic tribes to establish prestige and undermine 
Ottoman authority in Transjordan's frontiers. Ultimately, the frontier illustrates the fragile 
relationships between imperial government, its subjects, and empires. The challenges of 
establishing legitimacy through juridical, military, cultural, and economic institutions was 
difficult for the Ottoman empire but would also become difficult for the British empire, 
especially as it pertained to disarmament and the defined borders between Iraq and Syria.   
As the last section illustrated the challenges of establishing legitimacy in Iraq, it was just as 
challenging to sustain legitimacy as nomadic tribes crossed the rigid borders between French 
Syria and British occupied Iraq, especially during the buildup to the 1925 Great Syrian revolt. 
During the Iraqi insurgency, the British army had engaged in small skirmishes with ex-Ottoman 
officers and raiders on the Syrian border.102 These skirmishes were a byproduct of both a 
transnational conception of resistance, and the lack of French colonial governance and political 
structure. When the revolt ended, in 1922, the French colonial government created a political 
system in Syria of ethnic borders inside state borders. Paris divided their mandate into a series of 
religious micro-states, resulting in the sub statelets of Damascus, Aleppo, Jabal Druze (Hawran), 
Alexandretta, and Alawites. Robert De Caix, secretary-general in Syria, believed that the 
separation of minorities based on religion and ethnicity was easier for garrisoned units to control 
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their stations. He also thought that separating the minority religions – Druze and Alawites – from 
Sunni Islam would civilize them and save them from tyranny.103 However, similar to conditions 
in Iraq, French rule was met with a series of demonstrations due to horrific socioeconomic 
conditions.  
The Druze grew restless, resulting in the arrest of several Sheikhs from their respective 
regions. Sultan al-Atrash, his men, and a few ex-Ottoman officers responded with armed 
resistance. The French tried to confine the revolt to the Druze region, but it eventually spread 
throughout the mandate, as the population demanded  the end of French colonial rule, full 
independence, and unification of Greater Syria. Despite the failure of this uprising and the 
catastrophic aerial bombardments on urban centers like Damascus, the revolt spilled over the 
eastern border of Syria into Iraq and Jordan.104  
By 1925, the French experienced major defeats, especially at the battle of Suwayda, which 
caused discord between the French and British colonial governments and their encounter with 
the border. Sultan al-Atrash, the revolutionary Druze leader, conquered the major cities in the 
Jabal Hawran region. His troops moved on to the regional capital of Suwayda, where they 
defeated a French column, taking the capital's citadel. Al-Atrash and his men captured 2,000 
rifles with ammunition and supplies, several machine guns, and some artillery.105 After this 
decisive defeat, many inhabitants from the capital and surrounding rural communities joined the 
revolt. The local rebellion that started amongst a marginal community was now nationwide and 
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drew participants from neighboring regions. France tried everything to halt this revolt's spread, 
but it was too late once Damascus turned to armed insurrection. Unwilling to cope with their 
administrative mistakes, the French blamed the entire uprising on King Faisal and the creation of 
the small 20,000 manned army in Iraq.106 To France, the Syrian uprising was a nationalist ploy 
that started in Iraq. In response, France would bomb the city of Damascus, intending to prove to 
both their agitators while also demonstrating to Britain that they had the situation under control. 
Rebels would continue to fight, but Britain vehemently insisted that the problem stemmed from 
border mismanagement on the French side.  
After the Damascus bombing in 1925, the Syrian revolt intensified. As mentioned above, 
there was significant participation from anti-colonial rebels in Jordan and some from Iraq. In a 
letter from William Smart, the British Consul to Damascus, to Sir Austen Chamberlain, the 
Foreign Minister, Smart recounts a conversation he had with Henry de Jouvenel – the French 
High Commissioner at the time. Smart defends British border security, stating on March 21, 
1926,  
I endeavored to remove the apprehension entertained by him regarding Transjordan. I felt 
sure, I said that M. [Henry] de Jouvenel would return from Jerusalem with the same 
impression as I had brought back from Palestine and Transjordania, namely, that the 
British authorities were doing all that was possible to preserve the neutrality of our 
mandated territories. I added that there was one aspect of the case which, though not so 
evident to us at Damascus, had been brought home to me during my journey, namely, that 
after all it was for Syria to close her own frontier against political undesirables or 
contraband arms and ammunition. The fact that France had lost possession of a great part 
of the southern Syrian frontier threw on Transjordania the burden of what was really 
Syria's business. Nevertheless, I was convinced that there was great exaggeration in the 
reports given to the French regarding the circulation of rebel notables between the Jebel 
Druse and our mandated territories as well as regarding the arms traffic between 
Transjordania and the mountain. I mentioned that I had been told in Palestine that much 
of the arms contraband had been affected on the coast between Nakoura and Beirut and 
via Mount Hermon. Anyhow, reports in Transjordania seemed to show that the rebels 
 




were short of ammunition, and this was proof manifest of the efforts made by our 
authorities to check this traffic.107 
 
Smart is concerned with the ability of the French to occupy and surveil the Badiyah zone – the 
desert region that flows into Southern Jordan and Western Iraq near Baghdad or the Euphrates 
valley. Frontiers were challenging to maintain in the French mandate. France relied solely on its 
military to handle civil and regional disputes instead of creating an indigenous army in Syria. 
Civil unrest in Saudi Arabia and Turkey occupied the French military’s time and hastened 
France’s surveillance operations into Syria's remoter fringes.108  
Despite Britain dealing with arms traffic issues within its borders, it did manage to 
control the flow of people between mandated borders, creating passports and identification that 
made transnational migration difficult for nomadic tribes like the Bedouins. Additionally, they 
confiscated weapons in exchange to make some nomadic communities into farmers.109 
Compared to Britain’s rigid approach to mandate government and disarmament, France’s 
disarmament campaigns were unorganized, especially during the revolt of 1925.  
 In France, the mandate government tried to control and disarm Bedouin tribes through the 
Controle Bedouin office. It was an office that specifically studied the movement of Bedouin 
tribes in Eastern Syria to disarm them. Bedouin Sheikhs needed permission to commence their 
migration and carry weapons. The Controle Bedouin denied gun owners entry into semi-urban 
and urban places with weapons, so they left them at French weapon depots until they returned to 
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the steppe.110 However, the expectations of this elaborate disarmament system were not always 
perfect. Bedouin tribes avoided the checkpoints in the Badiyah zone and moved further north, 
crossing through the urban city of Aleppo. According to one French officer, "Disarmament: the 
operation allowed us to collect all the inoperative and unused guns which the Bedouins 
assiduously safeguarded to surrender them to the C.B. each year. Weapons actually in service are 
handed over only on infrequent occasions. Disarmament carried out this way is a farce."111 An 
example like this demonstrates that Smart was correct in his assessment. The Syrian revolt 
continued after the bombing of Damascus because of France’s poor disarmament campaign in its 
borders. On the other hand, Britain contained the problem of Bedouin tribes and their migration 
between borders.   
 Since the unilateral attempt at disarmament was not enough, especially during the Syrian 
revolt, the British and French needed to work bi-laterally to diminish violence between 
borderland communities, anxious about the potential for these conflicts to further exacerbate 
nationalist resistance in either Syria or Iraq. The San Remo agreement between Britain and 
France in 1920 did not solve security issues and did not create a delimited boundary between the 
two mandates.112 As stated previously, the Leachman line tasked both mandatory powers to 
shield cross-border anti-British support in their respective territories until the 1925 rebellion. The 
Leachman line was inconsistent and strained the relationship between France and Britain. It 
called for a more robust and systematic approach to borderlands and frontiers that expanded the 
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state and was unprecedented during Ottoman rule. Therefore, border insecurity led to the Anah 
Conference in 1927.  
 The purpose of the Anah Conference was for Britain and France to agree on how to 
enforce the rule of law and authority in their respective territory without violating each other's 
sovereignty. In situations like tribal raids and terror inflicted on settled communities, France and 
Britain worked together to settle disputes between rival sheiks and negotiate the end of tribal 
feuds for the sake of their state. The respective governments returned confiscated property and 
rewarded other incentives during these legal agreements.  
Furthermore, if either tribe on either side of the border broke this treaty, the victim tribe 
had every right to employ both British and French state forces to enforce the legal agreement, 
recreating stability in the region.113 Tribal leaders no longer handled conflicts. Bedouin Sheikhs 
could identify with the interests of their state, acting as partisans for their government officials. 
Like many other political documents, this one did not serve the interests of every signatory tribe. 
Still, it further consolidated state rule and provided a legitimate cause for disarmament, 
prevented raids, and tied these tribes closer to the state. 
The Anah conference proved to be more than just a treaty specific to the Middle East; it 
resembled a broader international project like the treaty of St. Germain, but Britain recalibrated 
the treaty to fit within a regional and imperial context. As stated before, the treaty of St. Germain 
tasked imperial powers and small states to limit – and in the case of colonial territories, outlaw – 
land, sea, and air weapons systems; their production, acquisition, deployment, and use.114 The 
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treaty aimed to ensure the stability of European possessions in colonial territories, and the treaty 
itself was meant to highlight the instability in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. In order to 
prevent war, it attempted to create a collective security system and widen the definition of 
disarmament. However, the Anah conference represented the “closed” phase of 
“interpenetration,” where Britain and France could exercise disarmament (military hegemony) 
within their respective colonial borders. The conference not only helped remove guns from rural 
communities and expanded the state, but it made the frontier a contested space that must 
continuously be governed and surveilled by the government to ensure that Anglo-French 






















 In conclusion, instead of upholding the intentions and aims of the St. Germain treaty, 
British disarmament in Iraq became a selective process to secure its self-interest in state-building 
and dominating the Middle East after the First World War. Iraq, along with many other former 
Ottoman territories, vehemently opposed British occupation and many actors within this project 
utilized their military experience – unsuccessfully – to overthrow British colonialism. These 
small skirmishes between anti-colonialists and the British military led to the creation of an 
indigenous government that was subservient to British imperialism. Disarmament also framed 
the internal and regional relationships between the colonial government and its imperial allies, 
but gun-smuggling and transnational resistance subverted these diplomatic relationships (as seen 
in the section on Britain, France, and the Syrian Revolt of 1925). Internally, despite the creation 
of an indigenous government and army, some rural communities sustained their economic and 
political autonomy through gun-smuggling. This complicated internal relationship affected 
regional diplomatic relations with France.  
Ultimately, this project has sought to tell four chronological stories that brought together 
the broader, and imperially focused, framework of arms control. Section one traced disarmament 
and British imperialism's discourse as a regional and international story from 1917 to 1920. It 
begins with a passionate speech from Mark Sykes in 1917, addressing the need for disarmament 
to prevent arms proliferation to other contested colonial spaces.  As the war became taxing for 
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the Ottoman empire, Britain forced the empire into a definite surrender. The Mudros conference 
confirmed the regional interests of the British empire in the Middle East. British officials 
demanded that the Ottomans surrender and withdraw all garrisoned units from Persia to 
Transcaucasia and from the Hejaz to Mesopotamia, where the British military would occupy 
these territories. By 1919, these negotiations solidified Britain's interests through international 
agreements like the treaty of St. Germain. This treaty formally ended the war, but Britain was 
tasked with a greater demand, disarming and preventing arms sales and transfers in the 
"prohibited zones," especially as the Iraqi revolt in 1920 challenged Britain’s imperial power.  
In the aftermath of the Iraqi revolt of 1920, section two begins with the Cairo conference 
of 1921. This section highlights how Britain met the obligations of disarmament by theoretically 
designing and constructing an Iraqi state that symbolized the centralization of power and force 
but also adhered to Britain’s economic and military interests. From 1921 to 1922, disarmament 
took on the form of (re)armament for a small Iraqi army and local alliances with tribal leaders. 
However, Britain and Faisal could not reach an understanding of the size and role of the Iraqi 
army, which was detrimental during a period that saw internal and regional conflicts that 
threatened stability in Iraq.  
 As the Dhafir tribal conflict demonstrates in section three, 1923 would become a long 
year for British officials to think critically about the expansion of state force amidst internal and 
regional crises. Britain’s response to the breakdown in tribal alliances was to further consolidate 
state power and violence along racial and ethnic lines. Britain enlisted minority-levied units that 
proved their loyalty and performance of military service through the Chanak crisis in 1922. The 
levied units would function as “shock absorbers” in internal conflicts but also collaborate  in 
operations with British military officers and the RAF. Simultaneously, the RAF was theorizing 
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about its own position in disarmament campaigns, which was to function as a punitive faction 
within the larger disarmament scheme.  RAF doctrine further monopolized violence and 
legitimized the state. As the state’s (re)armament campaign crystallized into a formidable 
strategy, disarmament shaped the state-building project to undercut and delegitimize tribal 
politics and power. However, the country's internal development was challenged and subverted 
by preexisting trade networks, gun-smugglers, and anticolonial agitation on the frontier, which 
also affected Britain's relationship with its imperial ally in the region, France.  
 Max Weber eloquently articulated that the state claims the monopoly of violence within a 
particular territory, and section four demonstrates how this monopoly broke down in frontier 
zones between 1925 to 1927. It begins with analyzing the various challenges and setbacks that 
the Ottoman state endured while expanding its sovereignty in frontier regions like Transjordan. 
The Karak rebellion in 1910 foreshadowed similar challenges and continuities between Ottoman 
and British governance in frontier zones. The Syrian uprising in 1925 is one of the challenges 
Britain faced with frontier zones, but the conflict also exacerbated France and Britain’s 
relationship. France often blamed Britain for mismanaging the Iraqi mandate due to the influx of 
weapons and personnel that migrated to fight French colonialism in Syria. France's speculation 
was also that Britain intentionally mishandled and incited the Arabs to cross borders and cause 
trouble. Eventually, Britain cracked down on arms traffic into Syria.115 The uprising ended in 
1927, and the issue of frontiers and sovereignty was a significant discussion at the Anah 
conference. This conference symbolized the rigid definition of borders between Iraq and Syria, 
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where each imperial power vowed to enforce the rule of law and authority in their respective 
territories. Despite the accusations from France and Britain and the codification of borders in the 
Anah conference, disarmament became complicated in a region where people saw their struggle 
against colonialism as transnational instead of restricted to nation-state borders and distinct 
cultures. Lastly, the Anah conference isn't without an international context, where preceding 
treaties like St. Germain anticipated moments like the Syrian revolt but lacked a clear and 
coherent definition of disarmament's scope.  
 This project has sought to expand the field's understanding of state sovereignty in 
mandate Iraq by studying disarmament and its limitations. Britain's ability to take an 
international initiative to disarm the world and appropriate it to fit within its imperial interests 
leaves further research possibilities. This project's scope was relatively small, so expanding the 
study to compare disarmament in other British colonial territories could shed light on borrowed 
methods between various colonial administrators. More scholars could study the relationship 
between military technology, violent resistance, and anticolonial rhetoric during the interwar 
period. These studies could reveal possible transnational or even global connections between 
rural communities, Muslim globalists, and internationalists sympathetic to the plight of 
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